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Purpose: To understand how individuals at risk for Huntington disease view the roles of others, e.g., family
members and health care workers, in decision making about genetic testing. Methods: Twenty-one individuals
(eight mutation-positive, four mutation-negative, and nine not tested) were interviewed for approximately 2 hours
each. Results: Interviewees illuminated several key aspects of the roles of family members and health care
workers (in genetics and other fields) in decision making about testing that have been underexplored. Family
members often felt strongly about whether an individual should get tested. Health care workers provided
information and assistance with decision making and mental health referrals that were often helpful. Yet health
care workers varied in knowledge and sensitivity regarding testing issues, and the quality of counseling and testing
experiences can range widely. At times, health care workers without specialized knowledge of Huntington disease
offered opinions of whether to test. Input from families and health care workers could also conflict with each other
and with an individual’s own preferences. Larger institutional and geographic contexts shaped decisions as well.
Conclusion: Decision-making theories applied to Huntington disease testing have frequently drawn on psycholog-
ical models, yet the current data highlight the importance of social contexts and relationships in testing decisions.
This report, the first to our knowledge to explore individuals’ perceptions of social factors (particularly family and
health care worker involvement) in Huntington disease testing decisions, has critical implications for practice,
education, research, and policy. Genet Med 2007:9(6):358–371.
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Although several aspects of genetic testing decisions among
individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD) have been in-
vestigated in the past, social factors and contexts, particularly
the roles of others (e.g., family members and health care work-
ers [HCWs]) in these decision-making processes have been
underexplored, and many critical questions thus remain. Al-
though studies in the 1980s suggested that most at-risk indi-
viduals would opt for testing,1–4 rates of testing have been
lower (e.g., 5–20%5,6).
Previous studies have assessed knowledge and attitudes to-
ward testing7,8 and identified several main reasons for test-
ing (e.g., obtaining certainty, future planning, helping
children9–11) or not testing (e.g., risk to children if one tested
positive, lack of a cure, threat to health insurance, testing
costs,12 fears of depression or problems coping with the
result13).
However, only a few studies have examined how individuals
at risk of HD make decisions. One study found that one third
of individuals each “proceeded to get testing without express-
ing any doubts,” “evolved” toward the decision, or experienced
a pivotal moment when they decided to test.14 Models, draw-
ing on the Stages of Change theory,15 have suggested that indi-
viduals pass through four stages, and go from being unaware
and unengaged to deciding to test, not test, or postpone
testing.16,17 But the impact of social factors on such stages and
processes has not been explored.
To understand genetic testing decisions, several additional
theoretical models have been proposed as well, but have also
tended to be individual based, drawing on psychological rather
than sociological or interpersonal models. For example, the
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Health Belief Model, based on studies of smoking cessation,
suggests that health behavior is shaped by perceived suscepti-
bility, disease severity, and costs and benefits of the
behavior.18,19 Models of stress and coping have described cop-
ing strategies as either “problem” or “emotion” focused.20
However, limitations have been described in applying these
two models to genetic testing.21 Health information in general
has also been described as meeting either cognitive or emo-
tional needs,22 and individuals have been described as risk
averse23 and as either seeking (“monitoring”) or avoiding
(“blunting) information.24,25 But, again, social factors and
contexts may play critical roles in health decisions in ways that
have not been linked to these theoretical models.
Indeed, sociologists, anthropologists, and others have long
described how individual decisions and behaviors in general
often take place in the context of social systems and
relationships.26,27 Sociological interactions and relationships
can involve a broad array of dynamic, complex pressures and
input that individuals can accept, resist, or negotiate.28
Social factors have been mentioned as playing roles in deci-
sions concerning aspects of other genetic diseases, and of cop-
ing with HD. For example, for breast cancer testing, under-
standing of risk has been found to operate in dynamic
interpersonal relationships and to be subjective.29 Familial
contexts can shape experiences of being at risk of HD,30 and
HD testing can affect family relationships and communication
(e.g., changing caregivers’ roles).31,32 An individual who tests
mutation-positive must decide within his or her family what,
when, and to whom to disclose the test results.33 In reproduc-
tive decisions for HD, perceived responsibilities toward others
can play crucial roles.34 However, these perceived responsibil-
ities can conflict with each other and with a patient’s own pref-
erences, creating dilemmas.35 One Australian study noted that,
as one aspect of HD testing decisions, individuals considered
hypothetical reactions from family members (i.e., how family
members might react) and perceptions of a family member’s
best interests. These imagined responses affected decisions to
test or not. However, this report did not examine many other
key aspects of these inputs, e.g., whether family members in
fact communicated directly with family members about these
testing decisions, and, if so, what exactly was said; whether
conflicts ever arose concerning testing decisions, and, if so,
how and when; and how at-risk individuals viewed or re-
sponded to these inputs.36
HCWs, too, may affect a patient’s decision making about
HD testing, but their role in doing so has also received little
attention. The Huntington’s Disease Society of America
(HDSA) has developed guidelines for genetic counselors for
testing,37 but many questions arise as to how well and fre-
quently these recommendations are followed and how at-risk
individuals view them. For genetic diseases overall, genetic
counseling affects reproductive plans.38 The experiences of pa-
tients with genetic counselors (GCs) have been explored re-
garding other diseases, but not HD. For genetic diseases other
thanHD, clients felt that GCs could have providedmore input,
particularly concerning disclosure.39 Of patients testing for
colorectal cancer, 53% reported that theymight have used pro-
fessional psychological support had it been provided.38 For
Tay-Sachs disease and fragile X syndrome in Israel, the major
reason for not having testing done was not being referred by a
physician for the tests.40 The only study that we were able to
find concerning HD counseling procedures, conducted in the
early 1990s, suggested that, overall, participants in a research
protocol were satisfied with the experience, although patients
and clinicians differed in their views of the importance of var-
ious aspects of the protocol.41
Questions arise, too, concerning interactions between indi-
viduals at risk forHDandHCWs in other fields. Several studies
have explored other diverse aspects of HCW knowledge, atti-
tudes, and behavior concerning genetics. For example, of pri-
mary care providers (PCPs), 31% to 56% have ordered genetic
tests of some kind for patients,42,43 and 95%of physicians think
that they have responsibilities to counsel patients about genetic
testing in general.44 However, most PCPs have been found not
to feel qualified to recommend genetic testing.45 Physicians
have also been found to have limited knowledge about
genetics.46 Among general practitioners (GPs), gynecologists,
and pediatricians, deficiencies in knowledge increased with
length of time since medical graduation.47 Medical trainees
reported insufficient genetics education and being unprepared
for colorectal cancer screening, and they have been found to be
deficient in knowledge, risk assessment skills,48,49 and notifica-
tion of at-risk relatives.50 Among a diverse group of physicians,
28% did not have access to a GC,43 and 23% of PCPs reported
that genetic consultation was very difficult to obtain, particu-
larly in rural areas.51 Indeed,19%of patients who underwent
genetic testing for colorectal cancer received genetic counsel-
ing beforehand.52 Physicians were more likely to refer for, or
order, a genetic susceptibility test if patients asked about it,42
and the strongest predictor of PCP recommendations or refer-
rals for testing was patient inquiry.53
Past literature and models concerning HD testing have also
underexamined whether and how larger social contexts, such
as the health care system, might be involved as well. Several
previous studies about HD testing were conducted shortly af-
ter the HD test was developed,30 but since then, more than 10
years have passed, during which the HD community has dis-
cussed testing more, electronic records have burgeoned, the
U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act took
effect, genetic discrimination has been documented,54 most
states have adopted genetic antidiscrimination legislation, GCs
have gained more experience, and patterns of U.S. insurance
coverage have shifted.55 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis
(PGD) has also become available, in which embryos are
screened for a genetic mutation, and only unaffected embryos
are implanted.56,57 with or without the presence of mutation-
positive embryos being disclosed to the parents. These phe-
nomena suggest the possible importance of considering
broader social and historical contexts in making and under-
standing testing decisions.
These questions about the roles of others in genetic decision
making are of increasing significance, given the increases in the
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numbers of genetic tests available and direct-to-consumer
marketing of many such tests through the Internet.58 At the
same time, suggestions have been made to decrease the
amount of counseling for genetic diseases other than HD.59
The further spread of managed care may also make referrals to
specialists increasingly difficult to obtain, taking time and
effort.
METHODS
On theoretical grounds, Geertz60 has advocated studying as-
pects of individuals’ lives and social situations not by imposing
external theoretical structures, but by trying to understand in-
dividuals’ own experiences, drawing on their own words and
perspectives to obtain a “thick description.” Hence, to under-
stand most fully the range of factors and issues that may be
involved in genetic testing decisions, we used qualitativemeth-
ods and, as shown in Table 1, interviewed in-depth 21 individ-
uals (eight mutation-positive for HD, four mutation-negative,
and nine not tested) for 2 hours each. Of these, seven were
symptomatic and 14 were asymptomatic. These individuals
represented a diverse sample in terms of education, occupation
and time since testing, as can be seen in Table 2.
Participants were recruited from an HD clinic that has a
predictive testing program. Staff at the clinic approached indi-
viduals who were at risk or had a clinical diagnosis regarding
the study. The staff reviewed the currentHD center database of
active patients and attempted to ask all individuals who under-
went presymptomatic testing or who were at risk if they would
participate. Participants were either patients or at-risk family
members and as such had had some previous interaction with
the staff. In all, 28 individuals were approached about partici-
pating, of which 21 (75%) did so. With each participant, the
principal investigator (PI) conducted a confidential in-depth
semistructured interview concerning experiences of being at
risk of HD and of undergoing the process of testing and/or
learning one’s genetic status. Interviews were conducted at
participants’ offices or homes or in the PI’s office, whichever
wasmore convenient for participants, and took approximately
2 hours, although varying somewhat in length. The Columbia
University Department of Psychiatry Institutional Review
Board approved the study, and all participants gave informed
consent. Relevant sample sections of the semistructured inter-
view guide are attached (Appendix), through which we sought
to obtain detailed descriptions of the process of individuals’
decisions concerning testing and related issues.
In our methods, we have adapted elements from grounded
theory, as described by Strauss and Corbin61 because we were
interested in understanding a social process. We have used
these methods in several other studies involving genetics35 and
other aspects of health behavior and doctor-patient relation-
ships and communications.62–68 Specifically, grounded theory
involves both deductive and inductive thinking, building in-
ductively from the data to an understanding of themes and
patterns within the data, and deductively drawing on frame-
works from previous research and theories. For example, in-
terviewees introduced topics such as differences in experiences
with the process of genetic counseling itself that were then
explored further in these and other interviews. Our approach
was informed constant comparison inwhich data fromdifferent
individuals were compared for similarities and differences to
see whether these suggested hypotheses. Constant comparison
generates new analytic categories and questions and checks
them for reasonableness. During the ongoing process of in-
depth interviewing, we repeatedly considered ways in which
participants resembled or differed from each other in their
decisions and in their social contexts and how these decisions
and contexts may be related. For example, we compared those
participants who decided to test versus not test versus delay
testing, those who thought the process was “good” versus
“bad,” and those who thought the process was “too long” ver-
sus was “not too long.” As shown below, in these comparisons,
input from others (e.g., family members and HCWs) were
found to play important roles. We also examined and com-
pared types of such interactions (e.g., individuals agreeing ver-
sus disagreeingwith the input). Transcriptions and initial anal-
yses of interviews were done during the period in which the
Table 1
Characteristics of sample
Subject ID Sex Race Symptom status Test status Marital status
1 F W Sx NT M
2 M B Sx NT M
3 M W Asx NT S
4 M W Asx  S
5 M W Asx  S
6 M W Sx  S
7 F W Asx  M
8 F W Asx NT M
9 F W Asx NT M
10 F B Asx NT S
11 M W Asx  M
12 F W Asx  M
13 M W Asx  M
14 M W Asx  M
15 M W Sx  M
16 F W Asx NT D
17 M L Asx NT S
18 M W Sx  S
19 F W Sx NT S
20 M W Sx  M
21 F W Asx  S
B, black; W, white; L, Latino; Asx, asymptomatic; Sx, symptomatic; NT, not
tested; , mutation-positive test result; , mutation-negative test result; M,
married; S, single; D, divorced.
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interviews were being conducted and helped guide subsequent
interviews. Interviews were conducted until “saturation” was
reached (i.e., “the point at which no new information or
themes are observed in the data”61,69).
Once the full set of interviews was completed, subsequent
analyses were conducted in two phases, primarily by the PI
together with a research assistant (RA) who had social science
training. At several points during the coding process, we also
received input from an additional senior expert in qualitative
research. In phase I of the subsequent coding, the PI and the
RA independently examined a subset of interviews to assess
factors that shaped participants’ experiences, identifying cate-
gories of recurrent themes and issues that were subsequently
given codes. These two coders assessed similarities and differ-
ences between participants, examining themes and categories
that emerged, ranges of variation within categories, and vari-
ables that may be involved. The coders systematically coded
blocks of test to assign “core” codes or categories. While read-
ing the interviews, a topic name (code) was inserted beside
each excerpt of the interview to indicate the themes being dis-
cussed. The coders then worked together to reconcile their
independently developed coding schemes into a single scheme,
developing a coding manual and examining areas of disagree-
ment until reaching consensus between them (i.e., when each
coder’s view of a phenomenon or theme raised by a participant
was reconciled into a coherent understanding of it). New
themes that did not fit into the original coding frameworkwere
discussed, and modifications were made in the manual when
deemed appropriate.
In the next phase of the analysis, we subdivided thematic
categories into secondary or subcodes, and then refined and
merged these, when suggested by associations or overlap in the
data. Codes and subcodes were then used in analysis of all of
the interviews.Major codes (or categories) of text included, for
example: discussions of counseling experiences, timing of test-
ing decisions, and input from family members and HCWs re-
garding decisions. Subcodes (or subthemes) were conceptual
and thematic subdivisions of these larger categories and in-
cluded pros and cons of the counseling process (e.g., empathy
of GC, views of the counseling process as repetitive or overly
long), types of interactions with family members or HCWs
(e.g., support or opposition concerning testing), and responses
to the input (e.g., deciding nonetheless to test, delay, or not
test). To ensure coding reliability, these two coders analyzed all
interviews. We examined areas of disagreement until consen-
sus was reached. To ensure trustworthiness, we consulted fre-
quently at multiple points with an external senior qualitative
researcher and triangulated the data with existing literature
relating toHD and other genetically associated diseases, as dis-
cussed above. The authors include trained clinicians who have
worked closely with patients at risk of HD for several years.We
thus triangulated the data with cumulative experiences from
several years of intensive clinical work. These data also have a
certain face validity that, we would suggest, further substanti-
ates their trustworthiness. We have presented below text from
Table 2
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the interviews to allow readers to judge these data for them-
selves as well.
RESULTS
Several critical themes arose concerning views of the roles of
others, particularly family members and HCWs, in decision-
making processes regarding HD testing. Overall, during the
decision-making process, family members and HCWs often
felt strongly whether an individual should get tested or not.
Interpersonal conflicts and pressures could ensue. As depicted
in Table 3, a 2 2 grid or table emerged in which an individual
may or may not want testing and others may want or not want
the individual to be tested. (Note: The identification number
of each subject, corresponding to the information in Table 1, is
indicated by a bracketed superscript.)
Roles of family members
Family members involved in these decisions included
spouses, siblings, parents, and adult offspring. On the one
hand, such family members can push for testing.
Mywife wanted . . . an answer: see what’s going on. So she pushed
me. After my mother’s death, I was depressed. She thought that
having the test would eliminate one possibility.[20]
This man at first opposed testing, but finally acquiesced.
Although his wife felt the test could help diagnostically, that
rationale did not sway him, at least initially.
Families may urge testing for several reasons, arguing, for
example, that for a member not to test was unfair to them. As
oneman said to his untested brother: “that’s fine for you not to
get tested, but it’s not very fair for your wife and your
children.”[13] Hence, at times individuals had to weigh their
own preferences and desires concerning testing against others’
sense of that individual’s responsibilities to these others. Here,
this participant had to weigh his sense of autonomy versus
others’ sense of justice and of his ethical obligations to them.
Not surprisingly, at-risk individuals did not always welcome
such pressure (e.g., “I don’t want to be in a relationship where
I’d feel even the slightest push that I should be tested.”[5])
At times, individuals decided to undergo testing to address
adult offsprings’ worries or concerns about reproductive deci-
sions. Without having to undergo testing themselves, adult
offspring could then learn whether they were, in fact, at risk of
having the gene and transmitting it to their progeny. These
offspring could then avoid potential discrimination to them-
selves (e.g., in obtaining insurance) and decide whether they
should undergo expensive PGD.
Yet such plans to test oneself before becoming a grandparent
were not always easy to carry out, as adult offspring could
become pregnant without forewarning their parents.
I had testing done—for my children. One’s married and just had
a baby. I was trying to get it done before that happened, but he had
a baby quicker than I thought. . . I wanted them to have all the
information available to them before they were going to have
children.[14]
A parent’s testing could also confront his or her adult off-
spring with unwelcome bad news and fears.
Conversely, concerns about family members led some indi-
viduals to decide not to test because they felt that the result, if
mutation-positive, might upset their offspring and create
problems when offspring tried to obtain insurance (i.e., if
asked about a family history of genetic testing). Hence, indi-
viduals decided not to test to avoid having to disclose painful
news to current progeny.
My older brother . . . decided he doesn’t want to know. If he
knows, he’ll worry more about the kids developing it, and what do
you tell the kids?[4]
Individuals made testing decisions in response to antici-
pated desires or responses of others that may or may not be
accurate. At-risk individuals may want to test, but do not do so
because of a spouse’s opposition as well.
The only thing stopping me is my husband. I want to get tested by
the time my oldest son is 18 . . . My husband is never gonna agree
about it. We’re going to have a fight about this.[8]
Her husband opposed her testing because he wanted to have
another child before she tested, and hewished to avoid stressing
her and their relationship.
He does not want me to be tested because he feels: “We have such
a good life right now, why chance that? Why spoil a good thing?”
. . . He’s scared I will find out I carry the gene and be nervous or
sad.[8]
They have discussed the decision, and she has, for the mo-
ment, yielded to his wish. Her anticipation of further conflict
prompted her to continue to defer testing.
Other family members may oppose an individual getting
tested because they feel the individual is not old enough to
know and/or would not handle the informationwell (e.g., “My
sister wants to test. But I don’t think she should. She’s too
young. She’d base too many big decisions on it.”[1]) Indeed,
Table 3
Preference of the at-risk individual versus others concerning the
individual undergoing genetic testing
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feelings arose that for others “ignorance is bliss.” As this
woman said about daughter, “I would just like to see her have
10 years with a good life of not knowing.”[1] Again, these beliefs
involve judgments that may be subjective (i.e., of what is best
for the individual) and be perceived as paternalistic.
Family members’ encouragement of testing can also en-
counter patient denial. Such “denial”may represent either psy-
chological resistance to the possibility of testing or psychiatric
symptoms of the disorder that can in turn impair personality
and judgment.
My brother was very resistant. Maybe . . . he was already symp-
tomatic . . . and thatmight have been affecting his discussionwith
me . . . He doesn’t know how sick he is. You can’t tell him, and he
can’t understand because cognitively, he’s impaired: . . . “I’m
fine. I’m getting better . . . My brain’s growing back.”[13]
Hence, direct symptoms of the disease can themselves affect
testing decisions. Family members who feel that an individu-
al’s opposition to their preferences is not justified could then
continue to pressure that individual.
Roles of HCWs
HCWs, too, influencedHD testing and counseling decisions
and varied in their approaches and responses to testing. While
GCs focused on genetic testing, at-risk individuals interacted
with a range of other HCWs as well, including physicians in
different fields, concerning HD. Overall, HCWs engaged in
several kinds of interactions, providing information about the
test, and assistancewith the decision-making process. At times,
HCWs without specialized knowledge about HD (i.e., who
were not neurologists, clinical geneticists, or GCs) also offered
opinions of whether an at-risk individual should or should not
undergo testing. In these interactions, HCWs varied in their
knowledge and sensitivity regarding these issues. In turn, at-
risk individuals responded to the HCW input in varying ways.
HCWs could provide important information about the
availability and the pros and cons of the test (e.g., of whether,
when, and how to test). GCs, in particular, offered useful in-
formation and suggestions and addressed the issues and ques-
tions involved. For example, GCs often made helpful sugges-
tions as to when to test, recommending doing so only after an
at-risk individual obtained insurance, so as not to be found
later to have a “preexisting condition” that could impede in-
surance coverage.
HCWs also helped individuals clarify the dilemmas the lat-
ter faced, which were not always easy. A GC’s professional
stance of relative neutrality could clash with physician training
to be more directive with patients and to recommend treat-
ments and tests, occasionally even paternalistically. HCWs of-
ten thought that individuals should take the test if the latter
were “the type of person who does better knowing.” Yet it was
unclear how exactly to define, assess, and predict this trait and
know in advance if one fit this category, especially with regard
to this unique information. GCs could help individuals assess
the presence or absence of this trait, but to do so could take a
somewhat long period of time.
I was very much on the fence. So, my 6–8months with the genetic
counselor became about where I actually am . . . I always as-
sumed I was a person who did better not knowing, but that was
not the case.[12]
HCWs can also takemore active stances, either encouraging
or discouraging testing. Here, HCWs may differ by profession
or specialty: while GCs are trained to be neutral or nondirec-
tive, other HCWs, such as GPs, may not be as sensitive or fully
appreciate the psychic costs involved.
It seems like the MDs you run across think testing is a great idea.
They say, “Just find out!” How dare they? Unless they are at
risk . . . I got that from my primary care doctor.[12]
Physicians outside of neurology or genetics could lackmuch
experience with HD or genetics.
The doctors I see don’t all know that it’s a dominant gene—that
there’s 50% chance of inheritance. They sort of know it’s a fidgety
disorder, but they don’t really know anything about it. They’ll ask
me questions: “Is it a dominant gene? What are the symptoms?”
. . . Or they’ll say, “Huntington’s, oh, I remember that some-
where.” But they don’t know any of the facts about it . . . GPs
don’t know.[21]
HCW sensitivity also varied and could be suboptimal, in
part due to poor education. Emergency department staff, for
example, may be relatively unaware of broader issues concern-
ing HD. One man’s father with HD had “health obsessions”
and frequently wanted to visit the emergency department
where “doctors didn’t know exactly what HD was. They just
didn’t know how to treat him . . . They think he’s not respon-
sive . . . The doctors were clueless.”[17]
At times, HCWs without specialized knowledge about HD
expressed strong opinions about the test and about whether an
individual should undergo it. PCPs may be wary of the testing
process and discourage it, in part because of their own beliefs
about its value or utility.
Mydoctor toldme, “go away. Don’t be silly.Whywould youwant
to have a test? There’s much more chance of you dying of a heart
attack or breast cancer . . . ” I didn’t like that response. But I
didn’t do anything about it for a few years. He should have putme
in contact with the HD association . . . [21]
In this instance, the doctor’s response delayed, but did not
ultimately prevent, testing. But other at-risk individuals may
not in the end oppose their physicians’ recommendations.
At-risk individualsmay also perceiveHCWs, includingGCs,
as disapproving of certain reasons for wanting to be tested.
The staff said, “you’re not being tested for a reason such as want-
ing to start a family.” I did not have a good reason. I just wanted
to know. They didn’t think that was a good enough reason . . . [8]
This woman thus deferred testing, but saw the staff as judg-
ing her reasons for wanting to be tested. Questions arose here
of whether HCWs’ judgments were always appropriate or may
occasionally be too paternalistic and of what constituted a
“good enough” reason. This woman’s account also under-
scored the degree towhichHCWs served as key gatekeepers for
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this genetic test. The newness and potential controversies sur-
rounding this test, compared with others, may give physicians
particularly key roles in these decision-making processes.
The counseling process itself is designed to compel individ-
uals to consider fully all the options, but because that process
takes time, tensions can emerge between HCWs and at-risk
individuals who do not appreciate HCWs’ motivations and
wish to be tested sooner.
I ran to the genetic counselor the day before my vacation. I was
fighting with staff: they said, “We’d really like you to wait six
months.” “How dare you tell me I have to wait?”[8]
At times, feelings arose that GCs were biased, warning of
potential dangers of genetic knowledge. “They tend to terrify
you to a certain extent, obviously in hopes of scaring off any-
one too sensitive to be able to take the answer in the end.”[5]
This perception of bias may or may not be accurate, but re-
flected some individuals’ beliefs and, as such, is of note.
A few interviewees felt that medically-oriented physicians
tended to favor testing, leading other HCWs to be more wary, in
part as a result.
Maybe that’s why the social workers tend to swing so far to the
other side . . . Social workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists tend
to be a little bit more respectful about how hard it must be, and
acknowledge that they have no idea what you’re going through.
Those medical people don’t know.[12]
Again, physicians may differ by specialty and training in
making recommendations, communicating empathy, and rec-
ognizing the difficulties of the decision-making process.
Friends
Individuals can receive input about testing decisions from not
only familymembers andHCWs, but friends as well. These unaf-
fected outsiders may or may not be sensitive to the complexities
and stresses involved in the decision.
People outside the family think “I would have been tested years
ago. I don’t know how you waited so long.” People don’t under-
stand: it’s just not easy.[8]
Commonly, outsiders were seen as not comprehending the
difficulties involved in these testing decisions. “I wish people
understood just the nightmare of what it is.”[13]
Balancing social input and other factors
As suggested above, an at-risk individual often had to bal-
ance these multiple, at times competing inputs against both
each other and his or her own desires and preferences. Partic-
ipants all agreed that ultimately, testing decisions should be
made by the individual. Yet weighing these often opposing
issues could prove difficult. For example, parents had to bal-
ance their own desires not to know their gene status against
their perceived obligations to undergo testing to help their cur-
rent and future children. They frequently prioritized testing to
help their children over fears of discrimination to themselves.
In balancing these conflicting issues, other disease-related
events commonly played key roles. An at-risk individual could
follow others’ preferences for a period of time until symptoms
become clear. Often, the final straw was when symptoms pro-
gressed to the point of impairing significant functions, partic-
ularly driving a car. At times, individuals waited to test until
confronting particular personal or professional junctures, e.g.,
deciding to test when forced to make major reproductive or
career decisions.
It came to a point where not knowing was as bad as having it. You
convince yourself you have it, so you might as well find out if you
have it or not . . . Should I go on to do a PhD, or have kids
early . . . career or family? . . . [21]
Here, consideration of potential future offspring helped
sway the decision.
Testing could also be deferred untilmarriage or being at a “sta-
ble point,” defined in various ways (e.g., having support from
others). The cost and time involved in the process of counseling
and testing could also deter testing. “I found out that I had to go
through 3months of therapy and that it costs almost $1,000 to be
tested. I don’t want to know that bad.”[16] This woman had to
balance desire for the information against several costs entailed
andwasmost swayed by the latter. Testing could be delayed until
the resources to pay for it, including insurance, became more
available.
A very big issue wasmoney – the cost of the test. I was working, but
not at a job with insurance. So, at first I didn’t have the mon-
ey . . . I wondered, “should I do this on insurance?”[15]
Obstacles of time and money were weighed with additional
psychological factors, but could also represent justifications
for not testing (i.e., when individuals also feared confronting
the prospect of the disease itself).
As mentioned earlier, the content of the counseling process
impeded such haste as well. A few decided they wanted to test
immediately, but even they, in retrospect, came to see such
eagerness as overly rash. In fact, even to learn how to arrange
for testing was not always easy. (“I picked up the Yellow Pages,
and called labs, saying ‘Do you run this test?’ They all said, ‘you
can’t just have this test done.’”[8])
As indicated above, at-risk individuals were thus influenced
by others and by social contexts in decisions about not only
whether, but when to enter the counseling process.
Views of the counseling and testing processes themselves
As shown in Table 4, interviewees suggested that the quality
and quantity of the testing and counseling processes them-
selves varied widely in several ways.
Institutions that conducted testing ranged from specialized
HD centers with strong social service supports to PCPs’ offices.
Hospitals, clinics, and offices often differed in their experi-
ences and abilities with HD diagnosing and testing. Some in-
stitutions had handled relatively few previous cases.
My sister is in a private hospital. The doctor said they were 90%
positive it was HD, but wanted to test. I said, “Has the hospital
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ever dealt with . . . HD before?” She said, “No.” “Has the doctor
personally ever dealt with . . . HD?” “No” . . . This pissed me
off . . . [7]
Such differences affected individuals’ decisions and experi-
ences. Institutions could provide more or less emotional sup-
port, and occasionally counseling was minimal, resulting in
suboptimal testing experiences.
My brother didn’t go through a program. A psychiatrist has been
giving himmedications for his obsessive-compulsive disorder. My
brother goes once every 3 months, not routinely. They don’t have
a strong connection. This doctor wrote the prescription for the test.
That was it . . . No counseling, no nothing, just that. That was a
mistake.[13]
Other times, there wasmore counseling, but it still fell short,
failing to provide sufficient follow-up or support over time.
The doctor said, “If you need to come back, talk to us.” I had his
office number, but that was it. I called . . . but they were moving
the office. I tried to reach out, but couldn’t get anyone . . . They
never got back to me.[14]
In particular, staff did not always sufficiently help anticipate
questions of how and to whom to disclose test results. (“I
didn’t know who to tell, or what to say. I wasn’t prepared for
it.”[14])
Anxieties persisted throughout these processes, even after
individuals decided to have blood drawn, and assessments and
treatments of anxiety ranged as well. Fears can hover promi-
nently not only before and during the counseling process, but
even after individuals decide to test. “It’s a sword of Damocles
hanging over you, especially the period between giving them
the blood and receiving the test results.”[13]
HCWs can address these anxieties in different ways. The
HDSA recommends “psychological and/or psychiatric screen-
ing” for depression and emotional support.18 Here, several in-
dividuals were referred to psychiatrists who prescribed anti-
anxietymedications as well. Hence, an added benefit of genetic
counseling could be referral to mental health services that are
not otherwise accessed. GCs themselves also responded to pa-
tients’ fears, e.g., by not knowing the test result before disclos-
ing it.
I was most scared about the walk from the waiting room to where
they were going to tell me . . . How the hell do you walk from one
place to the other with a person who knows? So the counselor
actually set up this elaborate plan where she was not going to
know, and was going to pick me up and walk me from the waiting
room to the room where I found out. So I wouldn’t have to walk
with someone who knew when I didn’t know.[12]
HCWs can reveal their suspicions about the presence of the
gene through not only verbal, but inadvertent, nonverbal com-
munication, too. Similarly, when becoming aware of a pa-
tient’s HD risk or symptoms, staff may change their tone of
voice. (“As soon as the HD discussion came up, the doctor got
very, very serious, and closed the door. He sat down and gave
us the numbers. He frightened us.”[7]) Consequently, HCWs
need to be sensitive to not only verbal but nonverbal interac-
tions about these issues.
However, regardless of theHCW’s sensitivity with gene pos-
itive test results, the process of giving the news can never be
wholly “good,” no matter how the process operates.
We saw the counselor’s face and knew in 2 seconds, because she is
a very la de da, very happy person . . . It was shock . . . We just got
the news and walked out. There was no counseling. Nothing. She
called up over the weekend. But it was such a definite thing . . .
here’s the results, thank you very much. See you later.[7]
The counselormayhave in fact provided additional support,
but under the circumstances, it may not have registered.
Frequently, the counseling process was seen as too long and
intense. GCs were often seen as playing the role of devil’s ad-
vocate, repeating the same questions. Yet generally, in retro-
spect, individuals came to understand the reasonswhy the pro-
cess took so long.
Table 4
Views of the testing and counseling processes themselves
Variations in
● Amount of institutional experience
● Quantity and quality of counseling
● Supportiveness of counselor
● Attention to disclosure issues
● Addressing of anxiety
● Form of counseling
● Nonverbal communication
● Communication of bad news that is hard to reframe positively
● Follow-up over time
● Content of counseling
● Psychological preparation provided
Views of length of the process
● Too long
● Same questions asked
● “Not applicable to me” because:
● Health care worker
● Already “very decided”
● But in the end seen as valuable
Helpful aspects of process
● Counselor posing unconsidered questions
● Empathy of counselor
● Referrals for psychotherapy
● Planning for disclosures and reactions
● Raising insurance concerns
● Planning how to live
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. . . they kept asking the same questions too many times . . . “Do
you really want to go through with this? Why . . . ? What purpose
can it possibly serve?” When I look back, I understand why-
. . . But they were persistent and annoying . . . They might just
say, “Look, you’re going to get annoyedwith us.We’re going to ask
some of these questions over and over again, but realize there’s a
reason . . . You just don’t know it yet . . . ” They even may have
said that, and I filtered it out.[13]
Hence, counselors could potentially set expectations more
realistically by more thoroughly describing the process in ad-
vance, and ensuring that it is understood over time.
At-risk individuals who had science training, in particular,
felt the process was too long.
The testing process can take 6 months: too long for me . . . Most
people . . . need that. But if someone wants to know in a hurry,
and knows his or her own mind, and is able to tell them, they
should do it quickly.[21]
Several lay individuals also felt that the lengthy process was
not wholly applicable to them because they had already seri-
ously considered and weighed the options. Hence, these data
highlight the need for flexibility in the process.
They really drill you. I understand why . . . But I felt I had a very
good reason to get tested. I didn’t waiver . . . Not everyone is so
ready, or has thought it through as carefully as I did.[4]
Indeed with time, many who initially, without counseling,
wanted to test immediately became aware of the complexity of
the issues and appreciative of the need for thoroughness in the
process.
My husband and I wanted to know right away . . . I didn’t need
the counseling . . . But then as it turned out, talking to staff here:
“O.K., we’re not ready to go through with this.” The biggest ques-
tion they asked us was, “What do you want to do if it comes back
positive? What’s your reaction going to be?” That was the killer
question.[7]
In this case, genetic counseling clearly served its intended
purpose well, prompting individuals to consider all possible
scenarios.
Certain aspects of the counseling process provedmost help-
ful, particularly presentations of questions that clients had not
considered, as just suggested, and of metaphors and ways of
understanding the dilemmas and phenomena involved.
They said to view it like a NY apartment:
You have a tiny NY apartment, and are so tight for space, and
spend ages organizing your closet, because you only have one.
That’s the same thing with theHD: if you know this is the amount
of time you have, you can make the best of it.[7]
In large part, GCs helped due to innate empathy, not neces-
sarily professional training per se. “She genuinely cares. It’s not
part of her job or training. You think: ‘At least I’m not
alone.’”[7]
Importantly, strong, reliable, and ongoing social support
cannot only helpwith the content of decisionmaking, butwith
overcoming feelings of isolation and aloneness.
As suggested earlier, referral tomental health services can be
especially beneficial. Psychotherapy can play several key roles
and prove critical in making testing decisions and accepting
results.
I’m really at peace right now . . . 10 years ago, I would have been
bonkers about the thought of having a genetic disease. But I’ve
been seeing my psychologist.[18]
Psychotherapy assisted here with acceptance, but can be
helpful even if not yet leading to complete acceptance of one’s
risk status.
My sister is too scared to know . . . but is really at a different point
than 10 years ago, too, when she first started seeing her therapist:
it’s not on her mind all the time like it used to be.[18]
Hence, psychotherapy can reduce the degree of preoccupa-
tion with either the threat of HD or the uncertainties inherent
in decision making, lowering the level of anxiety involved in
testing decisions. Consequently, mental health treatment can
be an important adjunct to genetic counseling.
[My therapist] is extremely helpful and I would recommend no
one go through testing unless they have someone who’s really
smart to help them through it.[12]
Looking back at testing decisions
Even when receiving a mutation-positive result, these indi-
viduals generally did not regret their decisions. Most felt that
their ultimate choice was right for them. Still, retrospective
assessment was hard, and might be biased by the test result,
previous assumptions, and subsequent decisions.
Not surprisingly, those who tested negative tended to have
few regrets. “The results of my decision make it impossible for
me to look back at my decision . . . It worked out well for
me.”[12]
But those who tested positive generally did not rue their
decision to be tested either.
The test itself has been an unambiguous, positive thing for me. I
have not had a single moment, not even in passing, that I wish I
hadn’t known. I had been aware of HDmywhole life. . . . The test
result made me feel that the decisions I made in my life were
good.[15]
Importantly, counseling helped in enabling individuals to
feel that their decision was appropriate for them.
Still, even those who felt that testing was beneficial for them
veered from recommending it for everyone. “What we did was
the right thing to do for us.”[7]
DISCUSSION
These data highlight several critical aspects of the roles of
social interactions and processes in decisions concerning ge-
netic counseling and testing for HD. These interactions with
family members, HCWs, and others proved important and
complex, but have been relatively underexamined. Specifi-
cally, many decision-making theories applied to testing for
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HD16,17,21,70,71 and other genetic conditions39,72 have focused
on individual cognitive and emotional factors, drawing onpsy-
chological models and emphasizing, for example, traits of
seeking or avoiding information and being risk averse.23,25,73
But the current data reveal how individuals make these deci-
sions in social relationships and contexts with multiple sets of
others, particularly family members (e.g., spouses, siblings,
current and future offspring) andHCWs (e.g., with or without
specialized knowledge of HD). Although one previous Austra-
lian study suggested that individuals considered family mem-
bers’ hypothetical responses,36 in the present investigation,
family members communicated directly their views of an indi-
vidual’s testing decisions and could affect those decisions. Per-
ceived responsibilities toward others have been found to affect
reproductive decisions among individuals at risk ofHD34 and at
times conflict.35 Here, others’ interactions also shaped testing
decisions and could clash as well both with each other andwith
an individual’s own preferences. A wide range of interactions
occurred, often involving competing views and moral dilem-
mas and eliciting a variety of responses and difficult compro-
mises and negotiations. At-risk individuals may be inclined to
avoid testing, but overcome that tendency to help their off-
spring; or an individual may tend to seek testing, but be de-
terred because of fear of discrimination to his or her family.
These types of social input shaped individuals’ decisions about
not only whether, but when to test. Although delays in testing
have been noted,17 the present data illustrate the key roles of
social factors involved in such delays.
Importantly, for genetic tests, arguably more than for many
other kinds of tests, HCWs served as crucial gatekeepers. Al-
though HCWs who are not geneticists or GCs frequently have
deficits in genetics knowledge and do not feel comfortable pro-
viding genetic counseling,45–49,52 the present data suggest that
these HCWs often are nonetheless involved in these decisions.
However, such physicians appeared here to follow a bimodal
pattern: somemay encourage testing toomuch, whereas others
do so too infrequently. Both of these extremes appeared to
stem from limitations in knowledge.
Despite HDSA guidelines about testing,37 interviewees re-
ported varying views and experiences concerning the testing
and counseling processes themselves. For genetic tests,more so
than for nongenetic tests, patients, whether legitimately or not,
may seeHCWs as judging patients’ rationales (particularly rea-
sons not considered strictly medical, e.g., “just wanting to
know”).
Although the HDSA recommends that individuals “not be
coerced” to test,18 these data indicate that familymembersmay
nonetheless apply strong pressure on an individual. Indeed, per-
ceptions and definitions of coercion range widely,28 and an
at-risk individual may choose to place family members’ wishes
over his or her own because of the relative strengths of each of
these sets of preferences or fears of those members’ reactions
otherwise. Importantly, clinicians should be aware of the pres-
ence of such actual or perceived pressures.
Questions emerged about what roles HCWs, especially phy-
sicians, should have in these decisions. No other study has
explored patients’ perceptions of the roles of HCWs in testing
decisions. These findings support reports of knowledge deficits
amongHCWswhodonot have specialized training in genetics.
Yet these data indicate that patients are nonetheless commu-
nicating with suchHCWs about these issues and at times are in
fact aware of these providers’ deficits. Although previous re-
search found deficits in HCW genetic knowledge and risk as-
sessment skills, the current data suggest deficits in communi-
cation and sensitivity concerning HD testing issues as well.
However, if physicians demonstrate or suggest relative igno-
rance or insensitivity about these areas, patients might instead
seek information on the Internet or through direct-to-con-
sumermarketers of tests, whichmay not be as trustworthy, and
confidence or trust in physicians concerning these and related
areas may decrease.
These data support HDSA recommendations for “psycho-
logical and/or psychiatric screening . . . based on the high lev-
els of depression found.”37 Indeed, this study suggests that
mental health services may frequently be helpful, particularly
because HD can precipitate psychiatric symptoms either di-
rectly or indirectly. Anxiety, too, arose here as a symptom.
Symptoms in parents who suffer from the disease can also psy-
chologically affect children. Such early “life trauma” can con-
tribute to stresses that make the receipt of genetic test results
later in life more difficult. Psychotherapy can help in address-
ing these issues. These data pose questions for future research
of how often and well such psychological screening in fact oc-
curs, particularly because other studies have suggested that
physicians who are not psychiatrists often have poor training
and abilities in screening for psychiatric disorders.74
Larger social contexts shaped decision making here as well.
Given that HCWs are purveyors of knowledge and gatekeepers
of referrals for tests, these data underline the importance of
institutional, historical, and geographic contexts, which have
been underexplored. We have found no studies on HD testing
decisions that have commented on possible differences among
industrialized countries (e.g., Canada, versus the United States
versus the United Kingdom) that have different insurance sys-
tems. Despite HIPAA, discrimination concerns for oneself and
one’s offspring arose here, but have not been mentioned in
some previous studies in Australia and Canada, where health
care is nationalized and hence guaranteed.14,30 Indeed, HD
testing rates appear higher in Canada than in the United
States.5,75
These contexts can also shift over time. Since several previ-
ous studies were conducted, testing technologies have ad-
vanced, and linkage tests are no longer used. Hence, the diffi-
culty of obtaining blood from relatives did not emerge here as
a reason not to test, as it has in the past.12 Importantly, adults
can also now undergo testing to decide whether they or their
adult offspring should consider the costly, and not entirely
benign, procedure of PGD.54,55 Although in the past, a leading
reason to test was “if my risk goes up, so does that of my
children”12; PGD now enables mutation-positive parents to
avoid passing on the mutation,56,57 furthering the possible
roles of social factors in testing decisions (i.e., to inform adult
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offspring whether they are at potential risk and should there-
fore undergo PGD).
From a theoretical perspective, these data underscore the
importance of viewing decision making about genetic testing
not as individualistic and unilateral, but as dynamic, social.
and interactive. That is, individuals often make decisions not
alone, but with input from several key sets of others. As sug-
gested by the health belief model, these individuals do weigh
the pros and cons about their decisions. But although this the-
ory is largely a rational decision model, the present data shed
light on the roles of social contexts and interpersonal pressures,
involving implicit and explicit authority. Individuals must
weigh complex moral factors (e.g., others’ perceptions of jus-
tice) and decide whether to reject or accept such input and, if
the latter, to what degree. Moreover, individuals also take into
account the actual or perceived potential effects of their deci-
sions on others. Thus, such a health belief model should not be
viewed in isolation or as simply a rational weighing of the pros
and cons. Rather, the decision-making process is complex,
subjective, and interpersonal, taking place in dynamic social
settings that can profoundly shape it.
Hence, these data highlight the need for theories that make
sense of these unique social aspects of genetics. Genetic disease
has direct social implications for not only the individual un-
dergoing the testing, but his or her family as well (i.e., in terms
of health and potential discrimination). Thus, familymembers
may have strong feelings that they express about an individu-
al’s testing decisions. These social implications may also in
turn affect HCWs’ approaches with a patient (e.g., increasing
HCWs’ encouragement of testing). Thus, genetics may require
different models of decision making than in other areas of
medicine. For instance, while theories on health information
have described traits of monitoring versus blunting, the
present data also suggest that these tendencies get weighed
against these other, at times competing, social factors (e.g., the
preferences, needs, andmoral claims of others). The strengthor
degree of tendencies toward monitoring versus blunting may
compete with the degree of perceived pressure from others.
Although “social learning theory” has also been described, sug-
gesting that individuals model behavior on others,76 the
present data indicate the need to develop and refine a “social
genetic decision-making theory,” which this article hereby
proposes, suggesting that the preferences and desires of others
shape an individual’s decision making, not through modeling,
but through the social contexts and implications of genetic
information on others. GCs and otherHCWs should recognize
and address such social processes as much as possible.
Recently, in decision making involving conflicting values
(e.g., between a patient and his or her family members), “clin-
ical pragmatism” has been advocated (as opposed to princi-
plism), emphasizing the importance of interpersonal
processes77 such as those here. An “arbitration” model78 has
similarly been advocated. Both models encourage exploration
of all competing views in such disputes. HCWs, in addressing
disagreements that they may face concerning genetic testing,
may benefit from awareness of such models.
Because HD is an autosomal-dominant neurodegenerative
disorder of adult onset, some aspects of testing for it are unique
and not identical to those posed by testing for other genetic
diseases. Nonetheless, this study has several important impli-
cations for certain other genetic conditions. As with other
adult onset disorders (e.g., breast cancer, 1-antitrypsin defi-
ciency, and familial adenomatous polyposis), patients may see
genetic test results for HD as reflecting an innate, unalterable
part of themselves, potentially threatening their future health,
having implications for the future health of other familymem-
bers, and possibly leading to future discrimination and stigma
against themselves or their families. Consequently, for these
other disorders as well, social factors and contexts (e.g., the
views and input of family members and HCWs) may play vital
roles in shaping individual decisions to test or not in ways of
which HCWs, in general, need to be aware.
These data thus have critical implications for professional
and public education. HCWs (both in genetics and other
fields), family members, and at-risk individuals can benefit
from being more aware of and prepared to address these com-
plexities. At-risk individuals may be aided byHCWs’ and fam-
ily members’ being as sensitive and supportive as possible con-
cerning these tensions thatmay arise. Becausemany physicians
completed their training before genetic testing for HD and
other disorderswas available, problems emerge concerning ap-
propriate provider communication and practice, how physi-
cians do and should handle new genetic knowledge. Clearly,
education is needed regarding not only the science of genetics,
but the intricacies and sensitivities involved in interacting with
patients about these decisions and the meanings and interpre-
tations of test results. Physicians outside of genetics may hesi-
tate to admit knowledge deficits to patients (e.g., saying “I re-
ally don’t knowmuch about this field or test, but can refer you
to a specialist.”) Rather, doctors operate usually frompositions
of authority that they may seek to maintain.
These data have practice implications as well, offering
several specific suggestions for helping HCWs be as effective
as possible concerning these issues. In part, given these so-
cial complexities in genetic testing, patients valued HCWs’
compassion, not only their technical skill. Nonverbal or in-
advertent communication affected patients. Consequently,
providers can arrange, for example, not to know results be-
fore sharing them with clients. It might be helpful also for
HCWs to convey (and perhaps periodically remind clients)
as clearly as possible of the reasons for the lengthy genetic
counseling process involved. HCWs also need to work more
closely with and educate spouses and other family members,
given the substantial roles these members may have in test-
ing decisions. HCWs, particularly those without specialized
knowledge of genetics, may benefit from understanding fur-
ther the complexities involved in not only whether butwhen
to test. These data highlight as well the importance of
HCWs’ paying attention to the psychiatric and psychother-
apeutic issues involved, entailing anxiety and other symp-
toms and arising either directly or indirectly from HD. Al-
though the HDSA recommends a multidisciplinary team,37
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it is unknown how often HCWs, including GCs, actually
note, or refer individuals for, mental health problems, espe-
cially in locations that may have fewer mental health pro-
viders. The fact that some at-risk individuals do not want to
use insurance poses additional potential challenges because
adequate mental health treatment is often not well covered
by insurance. This area should be addressed by researchers
and policymakers.
These data also highlight the need to study more fully com-
ponents and definitions of “adequate,” “satisfactory,” or “op-
timal” counseling and testing experiences, from patients’ as
well as HCWs’ perspectives. However, these data underscore
also the difficulties of evaluating these processes and HCWs’
roles in them, especially retrospectively. Past studies of posttest
responses have not examined differences in the amount or type
of genetic counseling.56
In short, it is not clear how frequently a “team approach”
occurs, what it looks like, what kinds of follow-up occur
over time, who initiates it, and of what it consists. Future
research can examine in further detail the quantity and
quality of these processes, staff background and amounts of
experience, costs involved, specific contents of GC discus-
sions, and differences in perceived adequacy and satisfac-
tion. As testing moves from academic medical centers to
wider routine clinical practice in diverse settings, such vari-
ations in the quality of counseling are vital to comprehend.
Concomitantly, the increase of direct-to-consumer market-
ing of genetic tests may lead patients to inquire about testing
more frequently with HCWs. Policymakers also need to as-
sess whether and to what degree insurance coverage of these
services should be increased and regulated.
Further research is needed as well regarding how exactly
HCWs vary (e.g., by type and recency of training) in ap-
proaches to genetics. It remains unclear what kinds of physi-
cians (e.g., GPs, family physicians, or neurologists) order, or
refer patients for, HD tests and in what ways and how com-
monly. Future studies need to assessmore fully how frequently
HCWs, couples, parents, and offspring view testing and agree
or disagree about it. Among HCWs, physicians (trained to be
directive) may display more biases than GCs (trained to be
nondirective). But the extent to which GCs are in fact nondi-
rective and neutral, the degree to which they vary, and what
factors are associated with such variation are unclear. Indeed,
among GCs, men have been found to be more directive than
women.79 Whether GCs are perceived to or, in fact, do have
preferences remains unknown.
This study has several potential limitations. We interviewed
participants at one point in time only, yet they described their
past and current HD-related experiences.We only interviewed
the patient, not the HCW or other family members about the
patient’s report concerning the perceptions and input of these
other individuals. However, patients’ perceptions are impor-
tant in and of themselves because patients are responding to
their views of the roles of, and interactions with, others. Future
research can investigate dyads ofHCWs and their patients con-
cerning their joint interactions. These interviewees were fol-
lowed at a tertiary care center. Hence, they may have had
greater than average knowledge of HD and access to resources,
but they provided key insights into responses to HD by par-
ents, siblings, and extended relatives atmany other institutions
as well. Although these individuals were from one geographic
area, they described their own and their family members’ in-
teractions in numerous clinics and areas, and no evidence has
emerged that views of HD decisions vary among geographic
areas in the United States. Further research can, however, as-
sess this possibility as well.
In sum, these data have several critical implications for fu-
ture clinical care, professional and public education, research,
and policy concerning decision-making processes about ge-
netic testing for HD and potentially for certain other disorders
as well.
APPENDIX: SAMPLE QUESTIONS FROM
SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE
●When did you learn that you were at risk of HD and what
was your reaction to it at that time?
● How do you feel about being at risk of HD?
● Have you had genetic testing done?
● If so, what was the result and how did you respond?
● How did you decide whether to have genetic testing done
or not?
● What factors were involved in your decisions?
● Have you ever felt stigma or discrimination because of
HD?
● Have you been concerned about threats to privacy? How
so?
●Have HCWs been involved in your testing decision? If so,
how?
● Do you have any other thoughts about these issues?
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